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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
RACHEL COKER,
Plaintiff,
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO.
: 2:11-CV-0091-RWS
ENHANCED SENIOR LIVING, :
INC., CAMERON HALL OF :
ELLIJAY, LLC, and CAMERON :
STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, :
Defendants.
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment [34], Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [35], 
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Amend Statement of Material Facts [46], and, 
finally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Due to 
Admission In Judicio [56]. After reviewing the record, the Court enters the 
following Order.
Background
Plaintiff Rachel Coker (“Plaintiff”) initiated this litigation by filing a 
Complaint against Defendants, her former employers, alleging discrimination
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and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (See generally Compl., Dkt. [1].) In 
particular, Plaintiff alleges in Count I of the Complaint that she is disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA and that Defendants discriminated against her 
because of her disability by failing to reasonably accommodate it. (Id. ^  18­
22.) In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for 
requesting a reasonable accommodation of her disability by terminating her 
employment.1 (Id. ^  23-26.) Plaintiff now moves for partial summary 
judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law solely on the issue of whether 
Plaintiff has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. (See generally Pl.’s 
Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Dkt. [34].) Defendants cross move for summary 
judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law on both of Plaintiff’s claims in 
their entireties. (See generally Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. [35].) Except 
where otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed.
I. Plaintiff’s Breast Disease
Plaintiff alleges that she is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA as
1 Plaintiff has abandoned the claim set out in Count III of the Complaint and is 
proceeding only on Counts I and II. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 
(“Pl.’s Opp’n Br.”), Dkt. [42] at 2 n.1.)
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a result of breast disease, which was diagnosed in the fall of 2009. Prior to this 
diagnosis, Plaintiff experienced multiple, painful lumps on her breast and 
noticed unusual discharge. (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts As To 
Which Respondent Contends There Are No Genuine Issues To Be Tried (“Pl.’s 
Statement of Additional Facts”), Dkt. [42-2] |  3.) In November 2009, after 
having a mammogram and ultrasound test, Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Rosa 
Langella, a Board Certified specialist and active member of the American 
Society of Breast Surgeons, who has been treating women with breast cancer 
and breast disease since 1997. (Id. |  5.) Dr. Langella observed several masses 
or nodules on both of Plaintiff’s breasts and diagnosed Plaintiff with breast 
disease. (Id. ^  6-7, 9.)
On January 10, 2010, Dr. Langella performed surgery on Plaintiff to 
remove and biopsy masses from both breasts. (Id. |  10.) The masses tested 
negative for cancer. (Id. |  12.) On May 17, 2010, Dr. Langella again examined 
Plaintiff, who complained that she had been experiencing spontaneous breast 
discharge for several months. (Affidavit of Rosa L. Langella, M.D. (“Langella 
Aff.”), Dkt. [34-3] |  4.) Dr. Langella again found masses on both breasts and
3
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recommended a bilateral major breast duct excision and excision of the masses, 
which procedure was scheduled for June 3, 2010. (Id)
On the date of this appointment, Dr. Langella gave Plaintiff a medical 
note that read, “New onset breast disease. . . . Patient was treated by me on 
5/17/10 in the office-at this time she was sch [sic] for surgery to be done 
6/3/10.” (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. [42-2] 1 37.) Plaintiff 
returned to work on May 19, 2010 and, as discussed in Part III, infra, gave her 
supervisor the medical note and asked for time off for surgery. (Id. 11 38-42.) 
As discussed in Part III, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on the same 
date. (Id 1 62.)
Plaintiff subsequently underwent surgery as scheduled on June 3, 2010. 
(Id. 1 5.) Dr. Langella saw Plaintiff for follow-up on June 8, 2010 and June 29, 
2010. (Id. 1 5.) Dr. Langella concluded that the masses on Plaintiff’s breasts, 
“while not cancerous, cannot be considered benign” and are “the result of 
abnormal cell growth and abnormal endocrine and reproductive functioning.” 
(Id. 1 5.)
II. Plaintiff’s Employment with Defendants
In September 2008, prior to the diagnosis of her breast disease, Plaintiff
4
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was hired to work as a cook for Defendants in Cameron Hall of Ellijay 
(“Cameron Hall”) (id. |  1), an assisted living facility (Affidavit of Sarah Jean 
(“Jean Aff.”), Dkt. [35-3] |  2). Defendants’ employee handbook identified 
excessive smoking, failure to complete work assignments, and excessive 
absence as disciplinary infractions. (Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts As To 
Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried (“Defs.’ SMF”), Dkt. [35-12] |  
2.) Defendants contend that throughout the end of Plaintiff’s employment, 
Plaintiff was in regular violation of these policies-repeatedly failing to show up 
for work, leaving work early, and smoking excessively during her shifts. (See 
generally id.)
At the time of Plaintiff’s employment, Cameron Hall had approximately 
twenty to twenty-five (20-25) total employees, including a kitchen staff of two 
to three (2-3) persons, making prompt and regular attendance critical. (Id. |  5.) 
From the outset of her employment, Plaintiff understood that prompt and 
regular attendance was important. (Id. |  6.) Indeed, between May and 
September of 2009, Plaintiff was in regular attendance, with the exception of a 
single incident in May 2009 when she received written discipline for failing to 
report to her shift. (Jean Aff., Dkt. [35-3] |  4.) Defendants contend that
5
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beginning in September 2009, however, Plaintiff “repeatedly left work before 
her shift was over, called out2 on short notice, and requested numerous days 
off.” (Defs.’ SMF, Dkt. [35-12] |  7.) Plaintiff does not dispute that due to her 
frequent and unscheduled absences, Defendants found it necessary, in the Fall 
of 2009, to train one of the caregivers at Cameron Hall to work in the kitchen in 
order to fill in for Plaintiff. (Id. ^ 10.)
Defendants state that Plaintiff was absent forty-two (42) days from 
September 1, 2009 through May 19, 2010, excluding the days Plaintiff left work 
early. (Id. |  9.) Specifically, Defendants contend that on January 24, 2010, 
three days after she returned from leave for her January surgery, Plaintiff had a 
call out. (Id. |  11.) They further contend that Plaintiff was out on short notice 
between February 8 through 13, called out without notice on February 21, and 
was absent again on short notice between April 7 and 8. (Id. |  13.) In addition 
to these absences, Defendants state that Plaintiff repeatedly left work early, 
resulting in complaints that Plaintiff’s duties were not being completed. (Id. |
2 Defendants explain a “call out” to be an absence reported by an employee on 
the day of her shift as opposed to arranged in advance. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. 
of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”), Dkt. [35-1] at 4 n.1 (citing 12/2/2011 Dep. of 
Rachel Coker (“Coker Dep.”), Dkt. [36] at 41-42).)
6
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14.) Plaintiff, along with her direct supervisor, Debbie Ledbetter, also received 
written discipline for violation of Defendants’ smoking policy on December 19, 
2009. (Id. 1 15.)
On April 13, 2010, Plaintiff was suspended for two days, according to 
Defendants for “performance issues including [Plaintiff’s] attendance problems, 
violation of the smoking policy, and her unprofessional interactions with co­
workers.” (Id. 1 16.) Plaintiff was not permitted to clock in or work at all on 
that date, in accordance with Defendants’ policy that “if somebody is being 
disciplined, then it needs to be handled right away, when they walk in on their 
shift.” (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. [42-2] 1 16 (quoting 11/30/11 
Dep. of Sara Jean (“Jean Dep.”), Dkt. [38-1] at 84:24-85:1).) According to 
Defendants, of the sixteen days Plaintiff worked following her suspension, she 
left work before her shift was over seven (7) times and called out absent on 
May 11 and 12. (Id. 1 18.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that her overall attendance record was “far 
worse than any other employee at the Ellijay facility.” (Id. 1 8; Pl.’s Resp. to 
Defs.’ SMF, Dkt. [41] 1 8.) Nor does she dispute that she was suspended for
7
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
two days for performance-related issues.3 (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF, Dkt. [41] 
|  16.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she was disciplined for violating the 
smoking policy on December 19, 2009, or that she had a call out on January 24, 
2010. (Id. ^  12, 15.) She does dispute, however, that she was absent a total of 
forty-two days between September 1, 2009 and May 19, 2009 and disputes 
certain particular absences identified by Defendants. (Id. ^  9, 13.)
In particular, Plaintiff disputes that she was out on short notice between 
February 8 and 13. (Id. |  13.) Plaintiff contends that she was not scheduled to 
work on February 8 and was absent on February 9 for an appointment with Dr. 
Langella for breast surgery follow-up, which appointment had been pre­
approved by Plaintiff’s supervisor, Ms. Ledbetter. (Id.) Plaintiff admits that 
she was absent between February 10 and 13, but states that she “advised Ms. 
Ledbetter of this [absence]” and that Ms. Ledbetter “did not object.” (Id.) 
Plaintiff further disputes that she was absent on February 21, pointing to payroll
3 Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ assertion that she was suspended for 
two days on April 13, 2010. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF, Dkt. [41] ^ 16.) In her 
Statement of Additional Facts, however, Plaintiff states that she was suspended for 
two days on April 14, 2010. (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. [42-2] ^ 15.) 
This discrepancy appears to be of no moment.
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records indicating that Plaintiff worked seven (7) hours on that date.4 (Id.) 
While Plaintiff admits that she was absent on April 7 and 8, to be with her 
mother, who was undergoing surgery, she states that this absence was pre­
approved by Defendants after Plaintiff produced a note from her mother’s 
doctor requiring Plaintiff’s presence at the surgery. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff 
contends that she did not call out absent on May 11 and 12 but, rather, “traded” 
those two days, with Ms. Ledbetter’s approval, to work two earlier days for 
which Plaintiff had not been scheduled. (Id. |  18.)
III. Plaintiff’s Termination
According to Defendants, on May 17, 2010, Sara Jean, Administrator of 
Cameron Hall,5 was informed that Plaintiff had taken twenty-one (21) smoke 
breaks, in violation of Defendants’ smoking policy, over the weekend of May 
15 and 16. (Jean Aff., Dkt. [35-3] |  13.) In response to this information, Ms.
4 The Court notes that the payroll records to which Plaintiff refers are contained 
in Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s deposition. The Exhibit, however, while referenced in the 
deposition, was not made a part of the record in this case and therefore cannot be 
reviewed by the Court. Both parties cite this Exhibit in support of their respective 
positions on whether Plaintiff worked on September 21. The dispute over this single 
date is not outcome determinative of any issue in this case, and, therefore, the Court 
did not require the parties to produce the payroll records for the Court’s review.
5 As Administrator, Ms. Jean is responsible for the overall supervision and 
operations of Cameron Hall. (Jean Aff., Dkt. [35-3] ^ 2.)
9
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Jean reviewed video surveillance footage of the smoking area, which confirmed 
that Plaintiff had taken twenty-one smoke breaks during that time period. (Id.) 
Ms. Jean thus recommended to Jacob Osaer, Ms. Jean’s brother and the acting 
CEO of the Defendant companies (Aff. of Joann Savage (“Savage Aff.”), Dkt. 
[35-4] |  2), that they terminate Plaintiff’s employment “based upon her overall 
poor performance, violation of attendance and smoking policies.” (Jean Aff., 
Dkt. [35-3] |  17). Mr. Osaer agreed. (Id.) This decision to terminate Plaintiff 
was approved independently by Joann Savage, the owner of Cameron Hall (and 
mother of Ms. Jean and Mr. Osaer). (Defs.’ SMF, Dkt. [35-12] ^  25, 28.) 
Defendants thus contend that the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made on 
May 17, 2010, prior to Plaintiff’s May 19, 2010 request for medical leave. (Id. 
n  27-29; Jean Aff., Dkt. [35-3] ^ 18; Savage Aff., Dkt. [35-4] ^ 6.)
Plaintiff paints a different picture of Defendants’ decision to terminate 
her employment. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF, Dkt. [41] |  17; Pl.’s Statement of 
Additional Facts, Dkt. [42-2] ^  38-56.) In particular, Plaintiff disputes that the 
decision was made on May 17, 2010 in response to Plaintiff’s violations of the 
smoking policy and prior to Defendants having any knowledge of Plaintiff’s 
request for medical leave. (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. [42-2] ^
10
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40-46, 50-53, 55-56.) Plaintiff contends, on the contrary, that the decision was 
made on May 19, 2010 in direct response to her request for leave. (Id. ^  40­
46, 50-53, 55-56.)
According to Plaintiff, after her appointment with Dr. Langella on May 
17 (and having been scheduled off for May 17 and 18), Plaintiff returned to 
work on May 19 to work her regular shift. (Id. ^ 38.) Plaintiff told Ms. 
Ledbetter that her breast disease had returned, that she was experiencing 
unusual breast discharge, and that she needed to undergo repeat breast surgery, 
during which procedure her nipples may have to be removed. (Id. |  40.) She 
asked Ms. Ledbetter for time off “in two weeks” and that she would need “two 
weeks off in June.” (Id. ^  41-42.)
Plaintiff states that upon hearing she would need two weeks off for 
surgery, Ms. Ledbetter “angrily yanked the medical note [from Dr. Langella] 
out of Plaintiff’s hand.” (Id. |  43.) Ms. Ledbetter told Plaintiff that she had to 
discuss this request with Ms. Jean and then proceeded to Ms. Jean’s office to 
discuss “that Plaintiff needed some more time off.” (Id. ^  46, 50.) Plaintiff 
contends that Ms. Ledbetter said nothing to Plaintiff regarding violations of the
11
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smoking policy. (Id. t  49.) Plaintiff proceeded to clock in for her shift and to 
serve lunch to the senior home residents, as usual. (Id. t t  58, 59.)
Plaintiff contends that it was during this conversation between Ms. 
Ledbetter and Ms. Jean that the decision was made to terminate Plaintiff’s 
employment. (Id. t  52.) Ms. Ledbetter testified in her deposition that she was 
driven to talk to Ms. Jean about terminating Plaintiff’s employment because 
Plaintiff “had still been wanting time off.” (Id. t  53.) And while Defendants 
assert that they were unaware of Plaintiff’s request for medical leave when they 
decided to terminate Plaintiff, Plaintiff points to an email written by Ms. Jean to 
a co-employee at 12:35 pm on May 19, with a subject line of “rae,” that read as 
follows:
Excessive smoking on 5-15 & 5-16
It all came up because now she has to be out for 2 weeks to have 
her nipples removed. She still has milk and puss coming out of 
them.
(Id. t  56; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Ex. 
A, Dkt. [42-1] at 1-2 of 29.) The recipient of the email responded, “Nipples, 
milk and puss? WHAT? Surely that would require more than 2 
weeks!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” (Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A, Dkt. [42-1] at 1-2 of 29.) It
12
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is undisputed that Plaintiff was terminated on May 19, 2010. Plaintiff contends 
that the only reason given for her termination was her violation of the smoking 
policy and that no reference was made to any attendance problem. (Pl.’s 
Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. [42-2] ^  63, 65.)
IV. Plaintiff’s Claims and the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment
As stated above, following her termination, Plaintiff filed a Complaint 
against Defendants for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA. (See 
generally Compl., Dkt. [1].) Plaintiff raises her discrimination claim in Count I, 
alleging that her breast disease constitutes a “disability” under the ADA, as 
amended, and that Defendants discriminated against her because of that 
disability by failing to reasonably accommodate it-i.e., by failing to permit 
Plaintiff to take medical leave for surgery and, instead, terminating her 
employment. (Id. H  18-22.) In Count II, Plaintiff claims that Defendants 
retaliated against Plaintiff for requesting a reasonable accommodation of her 
breast disease (i.e., medical leave) by terminating her employment. (Id. ^  23­
26.)
Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment solely on the issue of 
whether her breast disease constitutes a “disability” under the ADA. (See
13
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generally Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Dkt. [34].) Defendants, on the other 
hand, move for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims in their 
entireties. (See generally Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. [35].) In support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, 
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA and that, in any event, she is not otherwise qualified for her employment 
position due to absenteeism. (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 
(“Defs.’ Mem.”), Dkt. [35-1] at 14-18.) With respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation 
claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that she was terminated 
because of her request for a reasonable accommodation. (Id. at 24-25; Defs.’ 
Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”), Dkt. [48] at 2-10.) 
On the contrary, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was terminated because of 
violations of Defendants’ smoking policy and poor attendance. (Defs. Mem., 
Dkt. [35-1] at 21; Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. [48] at 3-10.) The Court first sets out the 
legal standard governing a motion for summary judgment before considering 
the parties’ motions on the merits.
14
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I. Preliminary Matters
First, Plaintiff moves to file a supplemental brief in opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Le., a surreply) to address an 
argument raised in Defendants’ reply brief, which argument Plaintiff contends 
is foreclosed by a statement made in Defendants’ Answer. (See generally Pl.’s 
Mot. for Leave to File Supplemental Br. Due to Admission In Judicio, Dkt. 
[56].) In particular, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff 
was not “otherwise qualified” for employment is contradicted by the statement 
in their Answer that “Plaintiff was able to perform all essential functions of her 
position”-a  statement that Plaintiff characterizes as an admission in judicio. (Id. 
at 2 (quoting Answer, Dkt. [9] |  21).)
“Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor this Court’s Local 
Rules authorize the filing of surreplies.” Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
366 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (citing Byrom v. Delta Family 
Care-Disability & Survivorship Plan, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1188 (N.D. Ga. 
2004)). “To allow such surreplies as a regular practice would put the court in 
the position of refereeing an endless volley of briefs.” Garrison v. N.E. Ga.
Discussion
15
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Med. Ctr.. Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 1999). Rather, surreplies 
typically will be permitted only in unusual circumstances, such as where a 
movant raises new arguments or facts in a reply brief, or where a party wishes 
to inform the Court of a new decision or rule implicating the motion under 
review. Cf., e.g., Fedrick, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 (stating “valid reason for . . . 
additional briefing exists . . . where the movant raises new arguments in its 
reply brief”).
Pretermitting the issue of whether the statement in Defendants’ Answer 
constitutes an admission in judicio, the Court finds the proposed surreply to be 
improper because the argument Plaintiff seeks to address was not raised for the 
first time in Defendants’ reply brief. On the contrary, the argument appears 
prominently in Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. [35-1] at 16-18.) As Defendants correctly argue, 
Plaintiff had a complete opportunity to respond to this argument in her response 
brief (and to argue that it is foreclosed by a statement in Defendants’ Answer) 
and, therefore, shall not be permitted to respond by way of surreply. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Due to 
Admission In Judicio [56] is DENIED.
16
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Second, Defendants seek leave of Court to amend their Statement of 
Material Facts [35-1] “in order to correct record citations due to clerical error.” 
(Defs.’ Mot. for Leave to Amend Statement of Material Facts, Dkt. [46].) The 
motion is hereby GRANTED.
II. Summary Judgment Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be 
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . . 
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) 
(internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, 
the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and 
present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does 
exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
17
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The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 
248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome 
of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 
Id. at 249-50.
Finally, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must 
view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 
(11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which 
are reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” 
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations 
omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (once the moving party has met 
its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply 
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
18
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Utilizing this framework, the Court considers first Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment before turning to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment.
III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [34]
As stated above, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment solely on the 
issue of whether her breast disease constitutes a “disability” within the meaning 
of the ADA. Both parties agree that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), 
governs the analysis of “disability” in this case. The ADAAA amended the 
ADA “to, among other things, promulgate a more liberal standard of the term 
‘disabled,’ making it significantly easier for a plaintiff to show disability.” 
Barlow v. Walgreen Co., No. 8:11-cv-71-T-30EAJ, 2012 WL 868807, at *4 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012). Indeed, an express purpose of the ADAAA was “to 
convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention in 
cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the 
ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of 
whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not
19
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demand extensive analysis[.]” Pub.L. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), Sept. 25, 2008, 122 
Stat. 3535.
The ADA defines “disability" to include “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual^]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Defendants do not dispute that 
Plaintiff’s breast disease constitutes an “impairment.” (Defs.’ Resp. Br. in 
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n Br.”), Dkt. [43] at 4.) 
The issue thus becomes whether her breast disease “substantially limits” a 
“major life activity” as those terms are defined under the ADA, as amended by 
the ADAAA.
As a result of the ADAAA, “major life activities” is defined to include 
“the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions 
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, 
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive 
functions.” Id. § 12102(2)(B) (emphasis added). With respect to the 
requirement that the impairment “substantially limit” a “major life activity,” the 
regulations implementing the ADAAA provide that the term “substantially 
limits” “is not meant to be a demanding standard” but, rather, “shall be
20
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). 
The regulations further provide:
(ii) An impairment is a disability . . . if it substantially limits the 
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as 
compared to most people in the general population. An 
impairment need not prevent, or severely restrict, the 
individual from performing a major life activity in order to 
be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every 
impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of 
this section.
(iii) The primary object of attention in cases brought under the 
ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with 
their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, 
not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of 
whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life 
activity should not demand extensive analysis.
(iv) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability 
if it would substantially limit a major life activity when 
active.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1) (emphasis added).
The regulations also recognize that, in light of the principles set forth 
above, certain types of impairments will be found, in virtually all cases, to 
constitute a “disability” under the ADA. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). The regulations 
explain that “[g]iven their inherent nature, these types of impairments will, as a
21
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factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a
major life activity” and therefore should demand only a “simple and
straightforward” assessment. Id. For example, the regulations state that it
“should easily be concluded” that:
Deafness substantially limits hearing; blindness substantially limits 
seeing; an intellectual disability . . . substantially limits brain 
function; partially or completely missing limbs or mobility 
impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair substantially limit 
musculoskeletal function; autism substantially limits brain 
function; cancer substantially limits normal cell growth; cerebral 
palsy substantially limits brain function; diabetes substantially 
limits endocrine function; epilepsy substantially limits neurological 
function; Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection 
substantially limits immune function; multiple sclerosis 
substantially limits neurological function; muscular dystrophy 
substantially limits neurological function; and major depressive 
disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive 
compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia substantially limit brain 
function. . . .
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).
In accordance with the foregoing principles, and the general instruction in 
the ADA that the term “disability” “be construed in favor of broad coverage, 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A), the Court finds, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s breast 
disease constitutes a “disability” under the ADA. The Court reaches this 
conclusion in light of the unrebutted affidavit testimony of Plaintiff’s treating
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physician, Dr. Rosa Langella, that Plaintiff’s breast disease is “the result of 
abnormal cell growth and abnormal endocrine and reproductive functioning.”6 
(Langella Aff., Dkt. [34-3] |  5.) Because the ADA expressly defines a “major 
life activity” to include normal cell growth and endocrine and reproductive 
functioning, and in light of the principles set forth above, the Court concludes 
that Plaintiff’s breast disease constitutes an impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity-i.e., a “disability” under the ADA. Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment [34] therefore is due to be GRANTED.
6 In their reply brief in support of their own Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendants, in a footnote, object to the admissibility of this statement on grounds that 
it is expert testimony and Dr. Langella has not been offered as an expert witness. 
(Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. [48] at 10 n.9.) The Court finds 
that Defendant has failed to properly object to the admissibility of this evidence, as the 
objection was not raised in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment but, rather, was raised, for the first time, in a reply brief in support of 
Defendants’ own Motion for Summary Judgment. United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 
1553, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Tafel v. Lion Antique Inv. & Consulting Servs., 
459 F. App’x 847, 849 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The district court had no obligation to 
consider an argument raised for the first time in [a] reply brief.”).
Even if the objection had been properly raised, however, the Court finds that 
the testimony is likely admissible under the authority of Williams v. Mast Biosurgery 
USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011), which recognizes that under certain 
circumstances, the testimony of treating physicians may be admissible as lay witness 
testimony.
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IV. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [35]
Defendants move for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims for 
discrimination and retaliation under the ADA. The Court considers 
Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiff’s Count I discrimination claim 
before turning to the Count II claim for retaliation.
A. ADA Discrimination (Count I)
As stated in the Background section, supra, Plaintiff raises a claim 
against Defendants for discrimination under the ADA, alleging that Defendants 
discriminated against her on the basis of disability by failing to reasonably 
accommodate her disability (i.e., by failing to give her medical leave to undergo 
breast surgery). The Court sets out the legal standards governing claims for 
ADA discrimination before considering Defendants’ arguments that they are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.
1. Legal Principles
The ADA “prohibits covered employers from discriminating based upon 
the known physical or mental impairments of a qualified individual with a 
disability.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278,
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1285 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112).7 To this end, “the ADA 
imposes upon employers the duty to provide reasonable accommodations for 
known disabilities unless doing so would result in undue hardship for the 
employer.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Where, as here, a 
plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, the 
analysis is governed by the burden-shifting framework established by the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 
2004).
Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of disability discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie 
case of ADA discrimination, the plaintiff must show: “(1) a disability, (2) that 
she was otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was 
discriminated against based upon that disability.” Id. (citations omitted). The 
third element may be satisfied by showing that an individual’s employer failed
7 This statutory provision states, “No covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, 
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12111(a).
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to make reasonable accommodation for the individual’s disability (and could 
have done so without undue hardship). Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285. 
“Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Combs v. Plantation 
Patterns. 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Once the plaintiff carries this burden of establishing a prima facie case. 
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the plaintiff’s termination. Cleveland. 369 F.3d at 1193; see also 
Combs. 106 F.3d at 1528 (“The effect of the presumption of discrimination 
created by establishment of the prima facie case is to shift to the employer the 
burden of producing legitimate. nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged 
employment action.”). The defendant at this stage need not prove that he or she 
actually was motivated by the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons; on the 
contrary. the defendant need only raise sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer’s decision was not 
motivated by discriminatory animus. Combs. 106 F.3d at 1528.
Finally. if the defendant carries this burden of production. the 
presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case
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disappears. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
reasons proffered by the defendant were merely pretext. Id. That is, “the 
plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the 
previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to 
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the 
employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment action.” Id. 
(citations omitted).
2. Analysis
In this case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to put forward a 
prima facie case of disability discrimination because she has failed to show (1) 
that she has a disability and (2) that she is otherwise qualified for the 
employment position.8 (Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. [35-1] at 14-18.) In light of the 
Court’s ruling in Part III, supra, finding as a matter of law that Plaintiff is 
“disabled” under the ADA, Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of her prima 
facie case. The only issue therefore becomes whether Plaintiff has 
demonstrated that she is “otherwise qualified” for the employment position.
8 Defendants also argue that it is “not clear that Plaintiff made any request for 
accommodation.” (Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. [35-1] at 22.)
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Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not “otherwise qualified” for her 
position “due to absenteeism.” (Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. [35-1] at 16.) To survive a 
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forward sufficient evidence 
for a jury to find that the plaintiff was “a qualified individual with a 
disability—ie., that the plaintiff was ‘otherwise qualified’ for the [job].” Lucas 
v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations 
omitted). A plaintiff is “otherwise qualified” within the meaning of the ADA if 
he or she, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Jackson v. Veterans Administration.
22 F.3d 277, 278 (11th Cir. 1994) (“A person is ‘otherwise qualified’ if he or 
she is able to perform the essential functions of the job in question.”). “If the 
individual is unable to perform an essential function of his job, even with an 
accommodation, he is, by definition, not a ‘qualified individual’ and, therefore, 
not covered by the ADA.” Holly v. Clairson Industs., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247,
1256 (11th Cir. 2007).
“Essential functions are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment 
position the [disabled employee] holds or desires.’” Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1258
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(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). It is well-settled that for many (if not most) 
jobs, regular attendance is an “essential function.” See, e.g., Jackson, 22 F.3d 
277 (“Because [the plaintiff] was absent numerous times within the first few 
months of his probationary employment on a sporadic, unpredictable basis, he 
could not fulfill this essential function of his employment, that of being present 
on the job, and was not otherwise qualified.”); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Centers, 
Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that an employee “who does not 
come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise”); 
Paleologos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1460, 1467 (N.D. Ga.
1998) (Carnes, J.) (noting that “the most essential function of any job, and a 
prerequisite to the performance of other essential functions, is attendance at 
work, for an employee who is absent can perform no function, essential or 
non-essential”). Indeed, this Court previously has found an employee to be not 
“otherwise qualified” for employment based on the employee’s undisputed 
record of absenteeism:
The undisputed evidence in this case reflects that Plaintiff had a 
prolonged pattern of excessive absence; indeed, Plaintiff does not 
dispute that she was out sick for approximately 68 days and was 
tardy approximately 25 times in 2004, excluding her FMLA leave 
in January 2004. . . . Defendant has presented additional evidence
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that throughout Plaintiff’s employment . . Plaintiff had a 
significant attendance and tardiness problem. In sum, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to 
establish that she is an ‘otherwise qualified individual’ or that she 
can perform the essential functions of her job despite excessive 
absenteeism.
Robinson v. Fulton County, No. 1:05-cv-2250-RWS, 2008 WL 78711, at *22 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2008).
In this case, the evidence shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that 
regular attendance was an essential function of Plaintiff’s job. In support of 
their argument that Plaintiff was not “otherwise qualified” due to absenteeism, 
Defendants point to the evidence they have presented regarding “Plaintiff’s 
record of calling [sic] the morning of an absence, leaving her shift early, and 
asking for time off without reasonable notice left [sic] Cameron Hall.” (Defs.’ 
Mem., Dkt. [35-1] at 17.) They also point to the fact that they had to cross-train 
a caregiver at Cameron Hall to work in the kitchen to fill in for Plaintiff and to 
Plaintiff’s two-day suspension in April for attendance and other 
performance-related issues. (Id. at 17-18.) Finally, Defendants contend that 
Plaintiff was absent a total of forty-two days between September and May 2009
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and violated Defendants’ attendance policies nine of the sixteen days Plaintiff 
worked after her suspension and before her termination. (Id. at 18.)
This evidence, while compelling, is largely disputed by Plaintiff. As set 
out in detail in the Background section, supra, Plaintiff disputes that she was 
absent a total of forty-two days during the period identified by Defendants. She 
also disputes certain particular absences they identify. Defendants identify 
twelve particular dates on which Plaintiff allegedly was absent without notice or 
with only short notice (i.e., January 24 (call out); February 8-13 (absent on 
short notice); February 21 (call out); April 7-8 (absent on short notice); and 
May 11-12 (call out)). Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ characterization of her 
absence (or that she was absent) on eleven of the twelve occasions identified: 
she contends that she was not scheduled to work on February 8; was absent for 
a pre-approved appointment with Dr. Langella on February 9; was absent with 
approval between February 10-13; was in attendance on February 21; was 
absent with approval on April 7 and 8; and, finally, that she “traded” the dates 
of May 11 and 12 with another employee to work two earlier days, for which
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she originally had not been scheduled.9 *1
In light of the evidence Plaintiff presents to dispute eleven of the twelve 
absences specifically identified by Defendants, and viewing that evidence in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has created a 
triable issue of fact as to whether she was not “otherwise qualified” due to 
absenteeism. As such, the Court cannot rule as a matter of law that Plaintiff 
was not “otherwise qualified” for her employment position and therefore not 
covered by the ADA. Furthermore, although Plaintiff does not dispute that her 
attendance record was “far worse” than that of any other employee, Defendants 
have presented no evidence regarding absences other than those specifically 
discussed above. These other absences, to the extent they exist, possibly could 
correlate with Plaintiff’s breast surgery in January 2010, or with pre-approved 
doctor appointments in the fall of 2009, when Plaintiff’s breast disease was 
discovered and diagnosed. In other words, to the extent other
9 Defendants argue that the latter assertion contradicts Plaintiff’s sworn
deposition testimony “that time records reflecting her absences on short notice on May
11 and 12 were accurate.” (Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. [48] at 6 (citing Coker Dep., Dkt. [36­
1] at 45-46).) Any such contradiction would not permit the Court to disregard 
Plaintiff’s evidence, however, but, rather, would be for a jury to consider in assessing 
Plaintiff’s credibility.
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non-specifically-identified absences contributed to Plaintiff’s “far worse” 
attendance record, Defendants have presented no evidence that these absences 
were not approved or otherwise excused. Absent such evidence, the Court 
cannot rule as a matter of law, based on Plaintiff’s admission that her 
attendance was “far worse” than that of any other employee, that Plaintiff was 
not “otherwise qualified.” Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff’s Count I claim for ADA discrimination therefore is due to be 
DENIED.10
B. ADA Retaliation
In addition to its prohibition on discrimination, the ADA also creates a 
prohibition on retaliation, providing that “[n]o person shall discriminate against 10
10 As stated in footnote 7 supra, Defendants also argue that it is “not clear that 
Plaintiff made any request for accommodation.” (Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. [35-1] at 22.)
The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff made a request for a reasonable 
accommodation. As set out in the Background section, supra, Plaintiff has presented 
evidence that she gave Ms. Ledbetter a medical note from Dr. Langella and requested 
two weeks off for breast surgery, after which Ms. Ledbetter went to Ms. Jean’s office 
to discuss Plaintiff’s request for time off. A jury reasonably could conclude, based on 
this evidence, that Plaintiff made a request for accommodation. As another court has 
explained, “To request accommodation, an individual may use ‘plain English’ and 
need not mention the ADA or use the phrase ‘reasonable accommodation.’” 
Pearce-Mato v. Shinseki, No. 2:10-cv-1029, 2012 WL 2116533, at *11 (W.D. Pa.
June 11, 2012) (citation omitted). Defendants thus are not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on grounds that Plaintiff failed to request a reasonable accommodation.
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any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made 
unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual has made a charge . . . under 
[the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In this case, Plaintiff claims ADA 
retaliation based on the allegation that Defendants terminated her employment 
in direct response to her request for a reasonable accommodation of her 
disability (i.e., request for medical leave). The Court sets out the legal 
principles governing ADA retaliation claims before considering the merits of 
Defendants’ motion.
1. Legal Principles
The same burden-shifting framework that governs claims for ADA 
discrimination also governs claims for ADA retaliation. Stewart, 117 F.3d at 
1287. Thus, as explained in Part IV.A.1, supra, the plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case. Id. “To establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) statutorily protected expression; (2) 
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected 
expression and the adverse action.” Id. “Once a prima facie case is established, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant employer to come forward with 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions that negate the inference of
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retaliation.” Id. “The plaintiff then must demonstrate that it will be able to 
establish at trial that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a 
pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation.” Id.
2. Analysis
In this case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima 
facie showing of ADA retaliation because she has failed to “establish any causal 
link between her protected activity and her termination.” (Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. 
[35-1] at 25.) On the contrary, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was terminated 
because of poor attendance and violations of the smoking policy. (Id. at 21.) 
They argue, finally, that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that either of these 
grounds for her termination is a pretext for retaliation. (Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. [48] 
at 3-10.)
The Court, as a threshold matter, finds that Plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case of retaliation through, among other things, evidence that she 
was terminated within hours of her request for medical leave. See, e.g., Thomas 
v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The burden of 
causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the 
statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action.”). The email
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authored by Ms. Jean on the date of Plaintiff’s termination, stating that “[i]t all 
came up because now [Plaintiff] has to be out for 2 weeks to have her nipples 
removed” (Dkt. [42-1], [34-4] (emphasis added)), further supports the inference 
of retaliation that arises from the close temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s 
request for leave and her termination.
The Court also finds that Defendants have carried their intermediate 
burden of producing admissible evidence that Plaintiff was terminated for 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons-in particular, Plaintiff’s attendance 
record and violations of the smoking policy. (See, e.g., Jean Aff., Dkt. [35-3] |  
17 (stating that Plaintiff was terminated based upon “overall poor performance” 
and “violation of smoking and attendance policies”).) Defendants have also 
produced evidence that this decision was made on May 17, 2010, prior to 
Plaintiff’s May 19, 2010 request for medical leave, thus precluding any possible 
claim for retaliation. (Id.) The issue thus becomes whether Plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find these 
proffered reasons to be a pretext for retaliation.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and drawing 
all reasonable inferences therefrom, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented
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sufficient evidence to establish that the reasons proffered for her termination are 
pretexts for retaliation. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff has come forward with 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the decision to terminate 
her was not made until after she requested medical leave on May 19. For 
example, Plaintiff declares that on May 19, she arrived at work early, worked 
the morning shift, and was terminated only after lunch-following Ms. 
Ledbetter’s discussion with Ms. Jean regarding Plaintiff’s request for leave. 
(Coker Decl., Dkt. [42-1] ^  8-11; see also 8/12/11 Dep. of Deborah Ledbetter 
(“Ledbetter Dep.”), Dkt. [38-3] at 67:17-68:15 (testifying that Plaintiff began 
working in a normal manner on May 19, 2010).) A reasonable jury could infer 
that if the decision to terminate Plaintiff, in fact, had been made on May 17, 
Plaintiff would not have been permitted to work the morning shift of May 
19-particularly in light of Ms. Jeans’ stated policy that disciplinary matters be 
handled “right away, when [employees] walk in on their shift.” (Jean. Dep., 
Dkt. [38-1] at 84:24-85:1.) Additionally, Ms. Ledbetter deposed that the 
decision to terminate Plaintiff was made on May 19: “[On May 19, 2010,] I 
went up to the office and was talking to Sara [Jean] . . . and we decided to let 
[Plaintiff] go.” (Ledbetter Dep., Dkt. [38-3] at 68:23-69:2.) Given this
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evidence, a jury reasonably could find that the decision to terminate Plaintiff 
was made after her request for medical leave-thus giving rise to a possible 
claim for retaliation.
With respect to the proffered reason of Plaintiff’s poor attendance, the 
Court finds sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the 
proffered reason to be pretextual. First, Plaintiff declares that when she was 
terminated on May 19, she was told that the reason for her termination was 
“taking too many smoke breaks on May 15 and 16.” (Decl. of Rachel Coker 
(“Coker Decl.”), Dkt. [42-1] |  11.) She further declares that at the time of her 
termination, no reference was made to any problem with attendance. (Id. |  12.) 
If a jury finds Plaintiff’s version of events to be true, and finds that poor 
attendance was not offered as a reason for Plaintiff’s termination 
contemporaneously with the termination, a reasonable jury could find this 
reason-offered after the fact-to be a pretext for discrimination. See, e.g., 
Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1194 (“. . . [S]hifting reasons allow the jury to question 
[a defendant employer’s] credibility. Once [that] credibility is damaged, the 
jury could infer that [the employer] did not fire [the plaintiff] because of the 
[reason proffered], but rather because of her disability.”).
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With respect to Plaintiff’s violation of the smoking policy, the Court 
similarly finds sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find the 
proffered reason to be pretextual. In particular, the Court finds a genuine issue 
of fact to arise on the basis of Ms. Jean’s email, authored on the same date as 
Plaintiff’s termination. The subject line of the email read, “rae,” and the first 
line of the email read, “Excessive smoking on 5-15 & 5-16.” (Dkt. [42-1].)
The line immediately below read, “It all came up because now she has to be out 
for 2 weeks to have her nipples removed. She still has milk and puss coming 
out of them.” (Id.) A jury reasonably could conclude that if Plaintiff, in fact, 
had been terminated for violating the smoking policy, Ms. Jean would not have 
written an email to a co-worker discussing Plaintiff’s impending breast surgery 
and request for medical leave. Indeed, a reasonable jury could infer from the 
crude references to Plaintiff’s medical issues, and the prefatory language “[i]t 
all came up,” that the real reason for Plaintiff’s termination was her request for 
leave, and the proffered reason of “[e]xcessive smoking on 5-15 & 5-16” a mere 
pretext for retaliation.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence 
from which a jury reasonably could conclude that the real reason Plaintiff was
39
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
terminated was her request for medical leave. Accordingly, the Court cannot 
rule as a matter of law that Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiff for 
making that request, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff’s Count II claim for retaliation must be DENIED.
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment [34] is GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
[35] is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Amend Statement of 
Material Facts [46] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Brief Due to Admission In Judicio [56] is DENIED.
This case is REFERRED to Chief Magistrate Judge Janet F. King for 
assignment to a Magistrate Judge for mediation. If the case is not settled, the 
parties shall submit a consolidated proposed pretrial order within 30 days of the 
completion of mediation.
Conclusion
SO ORDERED, this 18th day of September, 2012.
RICHARD W. STORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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